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The Limits of Paternalism:
A Case Study of Welfare Reform in Wisconsin
THOMAS S. MOORE
SWARNJ1T S. ARORA
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Institute for Survey & Policy Research

This paper uses a pooled sample constructedfrom the Food Stamp
Quality Control data for the fiscal years 1993 to 2006 to assess
the effects of welfare reform upon the employment, earnings,
income, and poverty trends among poor, single-motherfamilies,
both in Wisconsin and nationwide. It finds that the employment
and earningsgains of the Wisconsin families exceed those of comparablefamilies nationwide. However, there has been no significant change in the average income of the Wisconsin families, and
the number of extremely poorfamilies has increased more rapidly
in Wisconsin than in the country as a whole. These findings provide the basis for a discussion of Wisconsin's antipoverty policy.
Key words: welfare reform, paternalism,antipoverty policy

Introduction
The preamble to the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 that
replaced this country's cash aid welfare with Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) presents the policy goals
that the new welfare reform law was intended to achieve. These
goals center upon decreasing dependency through work and
providing assistance to needy families. The new law also seeks
Journal of Sociology &Social Welfare, September 2009, Volume XXXVI, Number 3
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to reduce unwed child-bearing and to encourage the formation
of two-parent families. However, there is little evidence that
state welfare reforms affect the child-bearing and marriage decisions of poor families, and while there has been an increase
in child support payments, it has been very modest (Acs &
Nelson, 2001; Grogger & Karoly, 2005).
In contrast to its explicit statement of program goals, the
new federal law places only general restrictions on how states
should pursue these goals. It imposes time limits upon the
receipt of cash aid assistance, and it requires that most aid recipients work or participate in work-related activities. However,
the deadlines and sanctions that states impose to enforce work
activity, and the proportion of their caseloads that they initially exempted from this work requirement, differ considerably.
PRWORA also neither requires nor places restrictions on the
use of financial incentives such as earned-income disregards
and more generous benefit-reduction rates that enable many
aid-recipient families to combine welfare benefits with earnings (Schoeni & Blank, 2000; Grogger & Karoly, 2005; Parrott &
Sherman, 2007). Given the multiple goals of the welfare reform
law and the relative freedom of the states to decide how they
will achieve these goals, there is considerable variation of the
design of state TANF programs.
The specific policies implemented by state TANF programs
not only differ, they also entail potential trade-offs with regard
to the goals of welfare reform. For example, financial incentives
such as earned-income disregards and more generous benefitrate reductions make it easier for aid-recipient families to raise
their incomes by combining earnings with welfare benefits.
Both experimental and econometric studies find that these incentives increase the employment, earnings, and incomes of
aid recipients. But they also find, ceteris paribus, that these incentives are associated with increased welfare use. In contrast,
time limits and work requirements that provide benefits only
in return for unpaid work activities have a larger positive effect
upon employment and earnings, and they are associated with
reduced welfare payments (Grogger, 2003; Grogger & Karoly,
2005).
Because state TANF programs implement different policy
combinations of financial incentives, work requirements, and
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time limits, and because these policies involve different tradeoffs with regard to the goals of welfare reform, the impact of
state TANF programs upon the aid-eligible population varies
considerably. The net effect of different programs upon family
income is hard to predict because the increased earnings of
aid-eligible families will be offset to some degree by benefit
losses under any combination of policy reforms. Nonetheless,
states that combine financial incentives with less rigid work
requirements and time limits can be expected to increase participants' employment and earnings while achieving smaller
reductions in welfare use. These states are likely to see relatively large income gains within the aid-eligible population. In
contrast, states that enforce strict work requirements with time
limits can expect larger reductions in the number of welfare recipients, as well as larger average increases in the employment
and earnings of aid-eligible families. But by imposing strict
work requirements and time limits, or otherwise restricting
the ability of aid-recipient families to combine earnings with
benefits, these states are also likely to see smaller income gains
by these families.
The effects of different policy combinations upon poverty
are also hard to predict, both because earnings gains are offset
to varying degrees by benefit losses and because the effect of
a net income gain (or loss) depends upon where that gain (or
loss) occurs within the income distribution. If the incomes of
families close to the poverty line increase, there is likely to be
a reduction in the number of poor even when there are larger
income losses among families well below the poverty line. In
other words, it is possible for poverty to deepen while the official poverty rate declines, and a number of studies have linked
welfare reform policies to deepening poverty among many
single-mother families. In the aftermath of welfare reform, the
number of single-mother families without earnings or public
assistance income has grown, and so has the number of children in families in extreme poverty-that is, with incomes less
than half the poverty line (Primus, Rawlings, Larin & Porter,
1999; Schoeni & Blank, 2000; Bavier, 2001; Parrott & Sherman,
2007).
In short, state TANF programs represent varying combinations of specific reform policies with differing trade-offs
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regarding the goals of welfare reform. These policy combinations and trade-offs make it particularly difficult to predict the
effects of state welfare programs upon the incomes of the aideligible population, and upon the level and depth of poverty
within that population. Nonetheless, state TANF programs
that give priority to caseload reduction and to moving aideligible families into unsubsidized employment do so at the
risk of deepening the poverty and increasing the hardship of
families that face the greatest challenges in transitioning from
welfare to work.
No state has made a greater effort to promote work and
reduce welfare dependency than Wisconsin, and this paper
presents a descriptive study of the state's mixed success in
achieving the goals of welfare reform. The next section discusses the history of welfare reform in Wisconsin and the
specific reform policies it has adopted. The following sections
compare the trends in the employment, earnings, income and
poverty levels of the state's poor single-mother families to
the corresponding national trends. This case study approach
does not enable us to measure the effects of specific reform
policies, or of the state's TANF program as a whole. It does,
however, provide a detailed description of how the state's
welfare reforms developed as part of a conservative effort to
reinvent antipoverty policy. That effort has been characterized
as governmental paternalism, a policy approach that imposes
behavioral requirements upon the poor in return for assistance
(Mead, 2004). By comparing state and national trends, this
paper presents a descriptive assessment of the achievements
and the limitations of Wisconsin's antipoverty policy.
Background: Welfare Reform in Wisconsin
The beginnings of welfare reform in Wisconsin can be
traced back to the election of Tommy Thompson as governor in
1986. From the outset, Governor Thompson made the replacement of welfare with work-based assistance programs the centerpiece of his administration's social policy. The welfare rolls,
which peaked at 100,000 families in 1986, had been cut nearly
in half by 1996 and fell to a low of less than 11,000 families
in 2000 before leveling off (see Table 1). These figures exclude
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over 10,000 AFDC cases involving children in parentless families that were transitioned to kinship care or to caretaker supplements. Nonetheless, Wisconsin's caseload decline exceeded
that of any other state with a substantial urban population. This
caseload reduction was widely attributed to work-based programs that began with the Work Experience and Job Training
Program (WEJT) in 1987 and culminated with the 1996 passage
of Wisconsin Works (W-2) that replaced Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) statewide in September, 1997.
Over half the states used waivers (that allowed departures
from AFDC program requirements) to begin welfare reform
before the passage of PRWORA, but none did so more extensively than Wisconsin. Unlike most states that added financial
incentives to the existing welfare system, Wisconsin demanded work as an eligibility condition for aid, and a principle
means of enforcing work has been to prevent applicants from
going on the rolls in the first place. Beginning with two welfare
waiver experiments in 1994, Work First and Self Sufficiency
First, Wisconsin encouraged and then demanded that aid applicants attend work orientations sessions and put in 60 hours
of job search at least 30 days prior to receiving AFDC benefits.
With the passage of W-2, these diversion efforts were institutionalized through the creation of a job ladder consisting of
four tiers, or placement levels. Former AFDC recipients did not
automatically quality for assistance as they did in many states;
they had to come in and apply like all other applicants and
show that they had exhausted all other sources of assistance.
Applicants meeting this requirement then met with a Financial
and Employment Planner (FEP) who determined eligibility
and placement on the W-2 job ladder. The preferred option
was to limit cash aid by requiring applicants to accept unsubsidized employment, while offering them non-cash support and
case management services. Only those judged unable to find
unsubsidized jobs were assigned placements on the W-2 job
ladder and granted cash aid in the form of flat monthly grants
(i.e., they did not vary with family size). Most applicants who
received cash aid were assigned to community service jobs
and given monthly grants of $673, while those judged least job
ready were assigned to transitional "work-activity" programs
that carried monthly grants of $628. Under TANF, these W-2
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participants were expected to progress up the job tiers into
unsubsidized employment within two years. Any failure to
meet the work activity requirements associated with their job
tier was sanctioned by having their monthly grant reduced by
$5.15 for each hour missed and, if the failure persisted, by termination of their grant.
In addition to diverting aid applicants from cash aid assistance, Wisconsin has relied upon extensive sanctioning of
W-2 participants to enforce work activity. These sanctions
emerged as a major issue in the administration of W-2 in 2001
when a statewide audit found that many participants were
being penalized inappropriately. That report by the Wisconsin
Legislative Audit Bureau (2001) found that 21% of the caseload had been sanctioned during the preceding year and that
45% of these participants had been sanctioned in error, often in
ways that did not accord with state policy. An earlier report by
the General Accounting Office (USGAO, 2000) had established
that W-2 participants were sanctioned more often and more
severely than the participants in almost any other state welfare
program. Unlike most states that apply sanctions only to a
portion of the TANF grant (i.e., that received by the participating parent), Wisconsin enforces "full family sanctions" under
which the entire cash grant can be withheld for instances of
work noncompliance. Unlike most states, W-2 also sanctions
for even one hour of missed activity, a policy which it terms
"pay for performance," and it limits the rights of participants
to appeal these sanctions by allowing the welfare agencies
to investigate their own disputed cases. Finally, unlike most
states, W-2 does not exempt a portion of its caseload from some
form of work activity. W-2's work-activity requirements are
immediate (with the exception of teen parents or the parents
of infants less than 12 weeks of age) and relatively strict, and
the "good cause" policies that govern when participants can
get an excused absence from work activity are not enforced
uniformly across agencies (Institute for Wisconsin's Future,
2005).
The diversion of former aid recipients and new applicants
away from cash aid, and the strict sanctioning of many who
received cash aid assistance, was enforced both through the
competitive selection of welfare agencies to run W-2 and
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through the initial performance contracts granted to those agencies. Under the so-called "right of first selection," public agencies were allowed to administer W-2 only if they first reduced
their AFDC caseloads by 25% between September 1995 and
August 1996. In several counties, including Milwaukee, where
the public agencies either failed or refused to meet this requirement, the contracts to administer W-2 were granted to private
agencies. The funding of those contracts was fixed, based upon
the caseloads at the beginning of the contract period, and the
agencies were allowed to keep up to 7% of the contract amount
as profit, as well as up to 10% of any remaining funds that were
unspent. Although these financial incentives were dropped
when the contracts were renewed in 2002, they motivated
agencies at the outset of W-2 to place as many aid applicants as
possible into unsubsidized jobs, thereby avoiding the expense
of creating community service jobs and transitional programs.
They also provided an incentive to impose sanctions for instances of work noncompliance, thereby reducing cash aid
grants and keeping the caseload to a minimum.
The redesign of welfare under W-2 thus centered upon the
enforcement of a strict work requirement, and it was accompanied by a relatively generous system of work supports. Apart
from the case management services and cash grants received
by W-2 participants, Wisconsin extended child care and health
care assistance to the entire low-income population. TANF
eliminated a major work disincentive under AFDC by delinking Medicaid eligibility from welfare receipt. The passage of the
State Child Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) then extended
Medicaid eligibility to children in families with incomes up to
200% of the poverty line. However, most states continue to restrict parental eligibility for Medicaid based upon the means
test used under AFDC in 1996, and in half the states a parent
becomes ineligible for Medicaid when her income exceeds 69%
of poverty (Greenstein & Guyer, 2001). Wisconsin is unique in
extending parental eligibility for Medicaid and child care assistance to 185% of the poverty level, with no charges or copays for families with incomes below 150% of the poverty
level. W-2 also allows two-parent families to receive cash aid
assistance, and it encourages child support by noncustodial
parents through a 100% pass through of all support payments
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to the family.
Unfortunately, the same diversion policies that limited
the receipt of cash aid also initially limited the receipt of these
noncash benefits by many eligible families. In assigning aid
applicants to either subsidized or unsubsidized work placements, FEPs were encouraged to follow a policy of "light
touch," providing applicants with or informing them about
only such assistance as the FEP considered necessary. In many
instances, this "light touch" extended to noncash benefits
that were not linked to cash aid welfare. The failure to inform
aid applicants of their eligibility for this assistance was more
pronounced in Milwaukee and other counties where private
agencies administered W-2 (Mead, 2004). Federal rules require
that eligibility determinations for noncash benefit programs be
made by public employees. Where county agencies continued
to administer welfare, the FEPs would refer W-2 applicants
to a Support Services Planner who would determine their eligibility for food stamps, childcare and Medicaid assistance.
Because they were employed by private agencies, the FEPs
in Milwaukee and a few other counties could not easily make
these referrals, and it appears that under "light touch" they
were not encouraged to do so.
Wisconsin is unusual in the extent to which it both imposes
a strict work requirement upon and provides case management assistance to cash aid recipients, while extending the
right to noncash benefits to low-income working families. This
combination of work requirements and supports makes more
demands of aid recipients while presumably supervising them
more closely to insure that they meet those demands. But to
characterize this as "paternalistic governance" assumes that
only potential aid applicants who are employable have been diverted from cash aid assistance, and that only those who refuse
to comply with work requirements, not those who are unable
to comply, have been sanctioned or terminated. In fact, many
of these families face difficulties that limit their ability to find
and hold jobs, including physical and mental health problems,
ill children or children with disabilities, alcohol and drug problems, low levels of education and cognitive skill, high levels
of domestic violence, and limited work experience. Families
facing these difficulties are more likely to be sanctioned for
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failing to comply with work requirements, and studies show
that sanctioned families that leave the welfare rolls have lower
employment rates than families that leave for any other reason
(Pavetti, Derr, & Hesketh, 2003). More generally, paternalistic governance assumes that poor families will comply with
work requirements because they have something to lose by not
complying. But how do you make demands upon nonworking
families that have been diverted or terminated from cash aid
assistance?
Wisconsin has been relatively successful at reducing
welfare use and promoting work. It greatly reduced welfare
use by requiring most poor families to seek unsubsidized jobs,
and it insured that cash aid recipients met TANF work requirements by sanctioning or terminating any who did not comply.
It is not clear, however, that Wisconsin has been successful
at helping poor families become economically self-sufficient.
Under W-2, participants cannot hold unsubsidized jobs and
receive cash aid grants, and maximizing the income of aid-recipient families by allowing them to retain earnings was never
a program goal. Consequently, the state's success in reducing
welfare use and increasing employment has likely involved
trade-offs with the goal of providing assistance to needy families, and these potential trade-offs raise a number of research
questions.
First, has the increased work effort and earnings of aid-eligible families been sufficient, on average, to offset the loss of
benefit income? In other words, has there been any increase in
the average income of aid-eligible families? If not, the sharp
reduction in welfare dependency will have been achieved at
the cost of little or no improvement in the economic situation
of the state's poorest families.
Second, has the distribution of income among aid-eligible
families become markedly less equal under W-2? If so, the
welfare losses of the families whose incomes have fallen may
exceed the welfare gains of those whose incomes have risen,
even if the average family income has remained stable or increased slightly.
Finally, and as a corollary to the preceding question, has
there been a substantial deepening of poverty and consequent increase in the number of extremely poor families under
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W-2? Perhaps the most unique feature of Wisconsin's welfare
reforms has been its extension of the work requirement to
nearly all aid-recipient families. But the diversion and sanctions policies that have enforced that work requirement may
have contributed to a substantial increase in the number of extremely poor families.
After discussing the data and measures used in the analysis, the following sections seek to answer these questions by
comparing the trends in the level and distribution of earnings
and income, and in the level and intensity of poverty, among
aid-eligible families in Wisconsin to the comparable trends
nationwide.
Data and Measures
In cities and less-populated states such as Wisconsin, estimates of the size of the poverty population are usually based
upon small subsamples from Census Bureau surveys. Because
of the small size of the subsample of poor respondents, using
these surveys to analyze income trends among poor households yields estimates that are highly uncertain. Many analysts
therefore supplement Census data on the number of poor individuals and families with administrative data derived from
social programs that serve people with poverty-level incomes.
Enrollment in the food stamp program (which provides food
subsidies to families with incomes up to 130 percent of the
poverty level) is frequently used as a proxy for the poverty
population. This study uses a pooled sample created from the
Food Stamp Quality Control (QC) data for the fiscal years 1993
to 2006 to document the employment, earnings, and income
trends among poor single-mother families. Single-mother
families account for more than 60% of food stamp families
with children and are most likely to be impacted by welfare
reform. Although the comparisons presented in Tables 2 to 4
are limited to single-mother families, the trends are essentially the same when the sample is expanded to include all food
stamp families with children.
The QC data are the product of an ongoing review of food
stamp units (i.e., families) that is designed to measure the accuracy with which eligibility and benefit determinations are
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made. The data are from a national sample, stratified by state,
of approximately 60,000 individuals and families receiving
food stamps during the fiscal year review period of October
through September. The data are collected by QC reviewers
who gather financial and demographic information from the
sampled unit's case files, then visit the household and re-interview the participants to insure that the information is correct.
Compared to surveys such as the Current Population Survey,
which typically underestimate the income received from
various sources, the QC data represents a more accurate and
complete assessment of both the earned and unearned income
received by poor families. In the QC data, and in the tables
presented below, earnings refer to the total amount of wages
and self-employment earnings received from unsubsidized
jobs. Income includes both earnings and "unearned income"
-i.e., the benefits received from various public assistance and
transfer programs. Family income thus includes AFDC and
TANF benefits, but these benefits are not included in earnings
even though their receipt is increasingly contingent upon work
performance.
All earnings and income data in the QC files were inflated
to 2006 dollars based upon the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U)
for the year in which they were reported. In order to simplify
the presentation and to reduce the effect of sampling variation,
the average employment, earnings, and income levels were
then averaged over two-year periods, beginning with the years
1993 and 1994 and extending through 2005 and 2006. In addition to verified earnings and income data for all food stamp
recipients, the QC data include a measure of family income
as a percent of the poverty threshold (for a given family size),
and can be used to estimate trends in the extent of poverty
within this population. Finally, the QC data include sampling
weights which enable us to estimate employment, earnings,
and income trends for the entire recipient population. The estimates presented here are adjusted in accordance with these
sampling weights, while the tests of statistical significance are
based upon unweighted data.
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Table 1: AFDC/TANF caseload, food stamp recipients, and number
of poor in U.S. & Wisconsin
Indicator:

1993-94

1995-96

1997-98

1999-00

2001-02

2003-04

2005-06

5,023

4,613

3,395

2,398

2,076

2,002

1,838

77,901

62,779

25,738

11,250

12,344

14,917

11,156

AFDC/TANF caseload,
U. S. (1,000s)
Wisconsin

Food stamp recipientsb
U. S. (1,000s)

27,193

26,037

21,283

17,626

18,167

22,210

25,238

Wisconsin

330,214

307,243

212,461

182,007

239,251

308,805

351,385

Number of poorc
U. S. (1,000s)

38,555

36,477

35,025

33,051

34,092

36,504

38,494

Wisconsin

526,340

451,087

470,754

451,945

510,134

562,608

568,850

Recipients as % of poor
U.S.

71%

71%

61%

53%

53%

61%

66%

Wisconsin

63%

68%

45%

40%

47%

55%

62%

'U.S.

Dept. of Health & Human Services, Admin. for Children & Families; and
Wisconsin Dept. of Workforce Development.
bU.S. Department of Agriculture, Food & Nutrition Service, Food Stamp Quality
Control Files, authors' calculations.
'U.S. Bureau of Census, Small Area Income & Poverty Estimates, 1993-1999;
American Community Survey, 2000-2006.

The QC data thus offer a number of advantages for studying income and poverty trends among poor families, but their
use as a proxy for the poverty population can be criticized
on two counts. First, it might be objected that family units
with incomes above the poverty level are eligible for food
stamps, and therefore the estimates of poor families are inflated. However, the program data show that over 90 percent
of food stamp recipients have household incomes below the
poverty threshold (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 1997), and the trends reported here explicitly focus
upon families that are below, and often well below, the poverty
line. Second, and more importantly, the number of families receiving food stamps fell sharply following the passage of the
welfare reform law (see Castner, 2000). Part of this decline
was due to both the tightening of certification to reduce the
error rate and to the denial of food stamp benefits to (most)
legal immigrants. However, the decrease in food stamp usage
was also linked to welfare reform and the increased stigma
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associated with all forms of public assistance (Greenstein &
Guyer, 2001). This is particularly likely to have occurred in
Wisconsin, where many welfare agencies and caseworkers
appear to have interpreted the policy of "light touch" to mean
that welfare applicants need not be informed of other forms of
public aid for which they remained eligible.
The figures in Table 1 document the AFDC/TANF caseload, the number of food stamp recipients, and the size of the
poverty population in Wisconsin and nationwide over the
period from 1993 to 2006. As the top rows of Table 1 reveal,
the number of welfare cases dropped dramatically between
1993 and 2000 before leveling off. The percentage decrease in
Wisconsin over this seven-year period amounted to 86% of its
1993 caseload, compared to a 56% decrease nationwide. (As
earlier discussed, part of the caseload decline in Wisconsin is
due to the reclassification of children in parentless families,
since they are ineligible for placement under W-2.) Paralleling
this decline in welfare receipt, the number of food stamp recipients dropped in Wisconsin by 45% between 1993-94 and 19992000, compared to a 35% decline nationwide. As the figures
in Table 1 also show, these declines in food stamp receipt far
exceeded the reduction in the poverty population during the
same period. Over this period the number of food stamp recipients decreased from 71% to 53% of the poverty population
nationwide, and from 63% to 40% of the poverty population in
Wisconsin. However, unlike the welfare caseload, the number
of food stamp recipients rebounded after 2000 and represented
nearly the same percentage of the poor in 2006 as they had in
1993. Thus, while the size of the food stamp population has
fluctuated, it continues to represent a large majority of the
poor. Consequently, any continuous increase or decrease in the
employment, earnings or income of food-stamp families over
the entire coverage period represents either an improvement
or a deterioration in the economic situation of most poor families. Continuous changes (i.e., secular trends) in these economic outcomes cannot be attributed to the fluctuations in food
stamp receipt.
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Table 2: Employment, earnings and income trends among singlemother, food stamp families in U.S. and Wisconsin
199394

199596

199798

199900

200102

200304

200506

Change

U.S.

19%

22%

30%

38%

36%

37%

41%

+22%**

Wisconsin

20%

25%

40%

41%

41%

48%

51%

+31%**

U.S.

$179

$200

$272

$336

$340

$341

$362

+$183"*

Wisconsin

$156

$196

$382

$424

$437

$481

$483

+$327**

U.S.: Mean

$704

$690

$735

$770

$755

$727

$714

+$10*

Std. Dev.
Coeff.
of
Variation
Variation

$400

$402

$440

$476

$497

$511

$520

0.57

0.58

0.60

0.62

0.66

0.70

0.73

WI: Mean

$901

$886

$916

$924

$926

$913

$892

Std. Dev.
Coeff.
of
Variation
Variation

$351

$367

$476

$512

$586

$591

$572

0.39

0.41

0.52

0.55

0.63

0.65

0.64

% Employed:

Earnings:,

Income:

-$9

Earnings/IncomeRatio:
U.S.

0.25

0.29

0.37

0.44

0.45

0.47

0.51

Wisconsin

0.17

0.22

0.42

0.46

0.47

0.53

0.54

Source: Food Stamp Quality Control Files, authors' calculations.
'Earnings and income figures are two-year averages (in 2006 $). Here and in Tables
3 & 4, the Chi Square test assessed the significance of the changes in the employment and poverty percentages between the initial and final two-year periods, while
two-tailed t-tests assessed the significance of the mean differences in earnings and
incomes. For both tests, **indicates p < .01.

Average Employment, Earnings, and Income
Levels of Poor, Single-Mother Families
The figures in Table 2 show the state and national trends
in employment, earnings and income among single-mother
families receiving food stamps. As we might expect, given
Wisconsin's strict work requirement as an eligibility condition
for aid, the level of employment among poor single-mother
families has risen more in Wisconsin than it has nationwide.
In Wisconsin, the employment rate among these families rose
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from 20% to 51% over the entire coverage period, a statistically
significant increase of 31 percentage points. The comparable
increase for the entire U.S. sample was from 19% to 41%, or
22 percentage points. Wisconsin has been comparatively successful at increasing employment among poor, single-mother
families.
Wisconsin has also been comparatively successful at boosting the average earnings of these families. Again using the
two-year averages at the beginning and end of the 1993 to 2006
period, and basing comparison on constant 2006 dollars, real
earnings rose from $156 to $483 among the Wisconsin families, more than a threefold increase. Over the same period the
average real earnings for the national sample of poor singlemother families rose from $179 to $362, a twofold increase.
As the bottom rows of Table 2 reveal, earnings account for a
growing share of the average income of these families, both in
Wisconsin and nationwide. In Wisconsin, the share of family
income derived from earnings increased from less than a fifth
to more than half, while nationwide the earnings share of
family income increased from a quarter to a little over half.
Yet, despite their relatively large earnings gains, there has
been no improvement in the average income of Wisconsin's
poorest families, either in absolute terms or relative to the
incomes of similar families nationwide. The average real
incomes of poor, single-mother families show no trend increase,
fluctuating around $900 a month in Wisconsin and around
$700 a month nationwide throughout the 14-year study period.
On the whole, poor, single-mother families are better off in
Wisconsin than they are nationwide, but they are no better off
in absolute or relative terms than they were in the years prior
to the passage of W-2. With regard to our first research question, there has been no significant change in the average income
of Wisconsin's aid-eligible families. The increased work effort
and earnings of these families has not resulted in any overall
improvement in their economic well-being.
Of course, averages are only part of the story. The achievements and limitations of welfare reform policies also depend
upon what happens to the distribution of income among poor
families. Table 2 addresses this issue by showing the trends
in two measures of income inequality-the standard deviation
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and the coefficient of variation (i.e., the ratio of the standard
deviation to the mean) of the sample income distributions.
Both measures show a substantial increase in the variability of
income among poor, single-mother families. Between 1993-94
and 2005-06 the coefficient of variation of the family income
distribution increased from .57 to .73 in the national sample
(a 28% increase), and from .39 to .64 in the Wisconsin sample
(a 64% increase). With regard to our second research question,
the economic circumstances of poor, single-mother families
have become increasingly disparate, and this change has been
much more pronounced in Wisconsin than it has nationwide.
To appreciate the implications of this growing income dispersion, we need to look at how incomes are changing relative to
the poverty threshold.
The Changing Income/Poverty Ratios among
Poor, Single-Mother Families
A recurrent finding in studies of welfare reform is that the
earnings and income gains of the past decade have not been
evenly spread across poor families. A growing number of
poor families have seen their incomes fall sharply even as the
overall poverty rate declines (see Parrott & Sherman, 2007).
Table 3 casts light upon this issue by comparing the poverty
trends among poor, single-mother families in Wisconsin and
nationwide. The figures in the table show the changes in both
the number and percentage of poor, single-mother families
with incomes at or above 75% of poverty, between 50% and
75% of poverty, and below 50% of poverty (based upon family
size). As these measures show, the number of extremely poor,
single-mother families has decreased nationwide along with
the number of poor, single-mother families in general. In contrast, Wisconsin has seen a marked increase in the number and
percentage of both extremely poor families and families close
to or above the poverty line. The proportion of poor, singlemother families in Wisconsin with incomes below 50% and
the proportion with incomes equal to or above 75% of poverty
each increased by approximately a fifth (i.e., by 23 and 18 percentage points, respectively).
It is important to note that at the outset of this period
Wisconsin differed greatly from the country as a whole in
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Table 3: Income/poverty ratios of single-mother, food stamp
families in U.S. and Wisconsin.
Number of Families:a

199394

199596

199798

199900

200102

200304

200506

Change

779

799

812

751

769

884

1,008

+229

648

709

782

-625

U.S.: (1,000s)
> 75% of Poverty
50-74% of Poverty

1,407

1,229

931

717

< 50% of Poverty

2,223

2,167

1,615

1,185

1,222

1,564

1,758

-465

Total Families

4,409

4,195

3,358

2,653

2,639

3,157

3,548

-861

> 75% of Poverty

14,851

14,898

13,472

12,717

15,716

21,105

24,082

+9,231

50-74% of Poverty

35,584

24,300

10,614

8,478

9,695

11,899

12,378

-23,206

< 50% of Poverty

5,833

13,231

12,236

9,508

13,592

17,451

18,330

+12,497

Total Families

56,268

52,429

36,322

30,703

39,003

50,455

54,790

-1,478

Percent of Families:

1993-

1995-

1997-

1999-

2001-

2003-

2005-

Change

94

96

98

00

02

04

06

18%

19%

24%

28%

29%

28%

28%

+10%**

32%

29%

28%

27%

25%

22%

22%

-10%

50%

52%

48%

45%

46%

50%

50%

0%

Wisconsin:

U.S.:
> 75% of Poverty
50-74% of Poverty
< 50% of Poverty
b

0.52

0.51

0.53

0.55

0.55

0.53

0.53

Standard Deviation

0.27

0.28

0.30

0.33

0.34

0.36

0.37

Coeff. of Variation

0.52

0.55

0.57

0.60

0.62

0.68

0.70

> 75% of Poverty

26%

28%

37%

41%

40%

42%

44%

50-74% of Poverty

63%

46%

29%

28%

25%

24%

23%

-40%

< 50% of Poverty

10%

25%

34%

31%

35%

35%

33%

+23%

Income/Poverty Ratio

0.65

0.64

0.64

0.65

0.65

0.67

0.67

Standard Deviation

0.21

0.23

0.31

0.34

0.40

0.44

0.43

Coeff. of Variation

0.33

0.36

0.48

0.52

0.62

0.66

0.65

Income/Poverty Ratio

Wisconsin:

Source: Food Stamp Quality Control Files, authors' calculations.
aAverage number of families over two-year period.
bAverage ratio of gross family income to poverty threshold over two-year period.
The Chi Square test assessed the significance of the changes in the employment and
poverty percentages between the initial and final two-year periods, while two-tailed
t-tests assessed the significance of the mean differences in earnings and incomes. *
indicates p < .01.

+18%**
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terms of the percentage of single-mother families in extreme
poverty. Only 10% of poor single-mother families in Wisconsin
fell into this category in 1993-94, compared to 50% of comparable families nationwide. Wisconsin's cash aid programs
did not keep families out of poverty, but they did prevent all
but a small fraction from being extremely poor. By the end
of the 1993-2005 period, however, both the number and proportion of extremely poor families in the state had increased
more than threefold. The incidence of extreme poverty among
Wisconsin's single-mother families has sharply increased to
converge toward the national average, and this increase clearly
coincided with the statewide implementation of W-2. Between
1993-94 and 1997-98 the percentage of extremely poor, singlemother families in the Wisconsin sample jumped from 10% to
34% and then leveled off over the remainder of the coverage
period.
Using incomes below 50% of the poverty threshold is a conventional, but arbitrary, way to measure deepening poverty.
A less intuitively appealing, but more accurate measure is
the coefficient of variation of the income/poverty ratios. Like
the average real incomes of these families, the mean income/
poverty ratio shows little change throughout this period, fluctuating between .51 and .55 for the national sample, and between
.64 and .67 for the Wisconsin sample. Dividing the standard
deviation by these averages shows how the income/poverty
ratios have become more unequal over time. This coefficient
of variation of the income/poverty ratio nearly doubles in the
Wisconsin sample, increasing from .33 for the years 1993-94
to .65 for the years 2005-06. Over the same period, this coefficient of variation increased from .52 to .70 for the country as
a whole, an increase of a little more than a third. The income/
poverty ratios of poor, single-mother families have become
more unequal nationwide, but the change has been far more
dramatic in Wisconsin. To understand what is behind this
increasing disparity, we need to look at how the sources of
income have changed for these families.
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Table 4. Income sources in top and bottom half of income distribution of single-mother, food stamp families in U.S. and Wisconsin.
199394

199596

199798

199900

200102

200304

200506

Ch

$321

$363

$497

$601

$605

$626

$670

+$349**

$419

$369

$276

$208

$168

$114

$97

-$322**

$990

$986

$1,066

$1,138

$1,143

$1,134

$1,132

+$142"*

$20

$21

$30

$55

$59

$49

$51

+$31*

$307

$295

$276

$221

$167

$128

$109

-$198**

$386

$365

$378

$378

$345

$309

$290

-$96**

$287

$340

$667

$698

$738

$855

$819

+$532**

$548

$484

$241

$168

$176

$69

$68

-$480**

$1,149

$1,147

$1,282

$1,331

$1,397

$1,387

$1,353

+$204**

$19

$43

$93

$151

$138

$106

$136

+$117*

$567

$521

$357

$201

$147

$93

$82

-$485**

$641

$607

$545

$516

$457

$437

$417

-$224**

ange

U.S., Upper 50%:
Earmingsa
AFDC/
TANF
Income
Gross
Income

U.S., Lower 50%:
Earnings
AFDC/
TANF
Income
Gross
Income
WI, Upper 50%:
Earnings
AFDC/
TANF
Income
Gross
Income

WI, Lower 50%:
Earnings
AFDC/
TANF
Income
Gross
Income

Source: Food Stamp Quality Control Files, authors' calculations.
'All earnings and income figures are two-year averages (in 2006 dollars). The Chi
Square test assessed the significance of the changes in the employment and poverty
percentages between the initial and final two-year periods, while two-tailed t-tests
assessed the significance of the mean differences in earnings and incomes. ** indicates p < .01.
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The Changing Income Sources of Poor,
Single-Mother Families
The rapidly growing income disparity among Wisconsin's
poor, single-mother families suggests that some of these families have been comparatively successful at raising their earnings and achieving real income gains, while many others have
been unable to earn enough to offset the loss of benefit income.
The figures in Table 4 support this interpretation. They show
the trend changes in the average real earnings, AFDC/TANF
income, and total income of poor single-mother families, both
in Wisconsin and nationwide, in the top and bottom halves of
their income distributions.
Looking first at the top half of their income distribution,
the average earnings gains of poor, single-mother families
have more than equaled the average loss of AFDC/TANF
income. The average real monthly earnings of these families
increased by $532 in Wisconsin (i.e., from $287 to $819), and by
$349 nationwide (i.e., from $321 to $670), between 1993-94 and
2005-06. These earnings gains were sufficient to offset the loss
of welfare income, which averaged $480 in Wisconsin and $322
nationwide. The real incomes of these families increased by
more than the difference in these earnings gains and welfare
losses because other forms of unearned income, especially
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), increased over this 14year period. The net result of these trends is that poor, singlemother families in the top half of their income distribution
saw their real monthly incomes increase by $204 in Wisconsin
and by $142 nationwide. Judging from these families, welfare
reform in Wisconsin has been successful in offsetting relatively large reductions in welfare payments with relatively large
earnings gains.
A very different picture emerges when we look at families in
the bottom half of the income distribution. Among these families, the earnings gains that have accompanied welfare reform
have offset only a small fraction of the welfare benefit losses,
and real monthly incomes have dropped precipitously. The
average monthly earnings of these families increased by $117
in Wisconsin (from $19 to $136), and by $31 nationwide (from
$20 to $51). These earnings gains represent a small fraction of
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the average loss of monthly welfare income, which amounted
to $485 in Wisconsin and $198 nationwide. Again, this loss
of welfare benefit income was cushioned somewhat by the
growth of other forms of government assistance. Nonetheless,
over this 14-year period the average monthly income of the
Wisconsin families in the bottom half of the distribution fell
by $224, or from $641 to $417 a month. The average monthly
income of comparable families nationwide fell by only $96, or
from $386 to $290 a month. As these figures indicate, there has
been a relatively small increase in the average earnings of families in the bottom half of this distribution, both in Wisconsin
and nationwide. At the same time, there has been a larger reduction in the average amount of welfare income in Wisconsin.
The answer to our third research question, then, is that there
has been a substantial deepening of poverty among the poorer
half of single-mother, food-stamp families in Wisconsin. Their
real monthly incomes have decreased by more than a third, a
proportionate income loss considerably greater than that experienced by comparable families nationwide.
Summary and Discussion
Wisconsin's work-based approach to welfare reform has
been widely acclaimed for reducing welfare use while increasing the employment and earnings of its poorest citizens. The
evidence presented here indicates that these achievements are
only part of the story. Wisconsin's poor, single-mother families
are, on average, working and earning more than they did, and
these employment and earnings gains exceed those of comparable families nationwide. The reduction in welfare dependency has not been matched, however, by any improvement
in their overall economic well-being. The relatively large earnings gains of Wisconsin's poor, single-mother families have
been offset by relatively large benefit losses and, as a result,
there was no significant change in their average real incomes
between 1993 and 2006. The overall economic situation of these
families showed no improvement, either absolutely or relative
to that of comparable families nationwide.
The incomes of poor, single-mother families have also
become more unequal, and the disparity in the economic
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circumstances of these families has grown more rapidly in
Wisconsin than nationwide. The percentage of families with
incomes that are either at or near the poverty threshold and
the percentage with incomes that are less than half the poverty
threshold have both increased markedly in Wisconsin. In sharp
contrast to national trends, both the number and percentage of
extremely poor families in Wisconsin have increased more than
threefold. The deepening poverty of the state's poorest families,
like the improving economic circumstances of those somewhat
better off, is a consequence of the changing sources of income.
Although cushioned by the expansion of other forms of government assistance, the amount of welfare income-averaged
across aid-eligible families-has dropped precipitously. This
decrease in the average amount of cash aid has been considerably greater in Wisconsin, which traditionally afforded more
cash assistance to poor families than the nation as a whole.
Poor, single-mother families in Wisconsin and nationwide now
depend upon their own earnings not just to escape poverty, but
to avoid extreme poverty. In light of this growing dependence
upon earnings, perhaps the most troubling finding in the preceding analysis is that the earnings gains among the bottom
half of Wisconsin's poor, single-mother families have been
only slightly greater than the earnings gains among comparable families nationwide. Wisconsin's welfare reform program
has been no more successful than TANF programs nationwide
in helping these families achieve economic self-sufficiency.
These findings provide the context for a critical evaluation
of Wisconsin's antipoverty policy. That policy has been characterized as a form of governmental paternalism because it uses
work requirements to set behavioral standards. A paternalistic
approach to antipoverty policy assumes that the poor are part
of the cultural mainstream in valuing work (i.e., they express a
desire to work), but they often fail to act in ways that are consistent with those values. In other words, the initial premise
of paternalistic policies is that the poor are poor primarily
because of their own behavioral failings. To insure that the behavior of the poor conforms to accepted values, this policy approach prescribes behavioral standards, and it enforces those
standards through close supervision and the threatened loss
of aid for noncompliance. In the view of their proponents,
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paternalistic anti-poverty programs serve the interests of both
society and the poor by enforcing behavioral standards to
which the poor are often unable to conform through their own
volition (Mead, 1997).
W-2 supervises the behavior of poor clients through its case
management services and placements on the W-2 job ladder,
but it extends those services and placements to a very small
fraction of potential aid recipients. The primary means of enforcing work has been through its diversion (and sanctions)
policies. These diversion policies are defended on the grounds
that they do not deny assistance to the poor. Rather, they are
claimed to be directive in the sense that aid applicants are informed of the behavioral requirements associated with assistance, and those who are work-ready simply decide to avoid
welfare. But such rationalizations assume that poor clients
who have not conformed to work norms through their own
volition will suddenly do so when informed of W-2's work requirements. If poverty is primarily the result of behavioral failings rooted in the lifestyles of the poor, it seems unlikely that
diversion policies are going to enable the poor to overcome
these behavioral failings.
It is more accurate to say that the state's diversion and
sanctions policies are a principal reason why W-2 has had so
little success at improving the economic circumstances of the
state's poorest families. By either diverting or sanctioning the
majority of aid applicants, Wisconsin showed the limits of its
commitment to providing the supervision and work supports
that many poor families need to meet the new work requirements. For example, the proponents of paternalistic policies
acknowledge that it is necessary to screen high-risk populations for mental disorders and to provide treatment, especially
for depression, before enforcing behavioral changes through
diversion and sanctions policies (see Shore, 1997). However,
the provision of services under W-2, including screening and
treatment programs for depression, has been limited to the
small fraction of the aid-eligible population that continued
to receive assistance after the state diverted the majority of
the aid-eligible population from its welfare rolls. The subsequent collapse of the W-2 caseload led to a partial revision of
the program's diversion and sanctions policies. But there has
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been little effort to recruit aid-eligible families and extend to
them the case management and other work supports available
under W-2. As the figures in Table 1 show, the number of W-2
placements, which includes cases with and those without cash
assistance, has leveled off and represents a small percentage
of the state's aid-eligible families. Today, the state's worsening financial situation limits its ability to provide additional
support services, but those budgetary constraints were considerably looser at the outset of welfare reform. The policies that
the state began to implement well before the inauguration of
W-2 were intended to achieve rapid caseload reduction, even
if that meant denying many poor families the supervision and
support services they needed to make successful transitions
from welfare to work. Rather than a commitment to paternalistic governance, the implementation of W-2 was guided by
the traditional conservative belief that the problems of the
poor are best addressed by enforcing work norms, regardless
of the readiness of many poor families to make the transition
to unsubsidized employment. It seems somewhat ironic, but
the conservative beliefs that gave impetus to paternalistic antipoverty policies ultimately limit what can be achieved through
those policy initiatives.
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